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I. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS: 
All parties to this proceeding are set forth in the caption of 
the case. 
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IV. JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(h). 
This is a final judgment of dismissal of Appellant's Verified 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. The lower court initially 
had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Appellee's domesticating 
her entire California Decree of Dissolution in the Fifth District 
Court in and for Washington County, Utah. 
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V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
A. ISSUE FOR REVIEW: JURISDICTION OF UTAH COURT AFTER 
DOMESTICATION OF ENTIRE FOREIGN DECREE 
Where Plaintiff, who resides in California, filed in Utah 
district court and served upon Defendant, her former Husband and 
Utah resident, a Notice of Entry of Foreign Judgment as to 
Plaintiff's entire California Decree of Divorce, thereby 
domesticating her entire California Decree of Divorce in that same 
Utah district court, and thereupon sought additional equitable 
relief from that same Utah district court against Defendant, DID 
THE LOWER COURT ERR in dismissing Defendant's affirmative defense 
of materially changed circumstances, brought through a Verified 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, holding that the Court lacked 
subject matter and personal jurisdiction as to Utah resident's 
Petition to Modify while holding him responsible for California 
Plaintiff's claims which arose out of the same fully domesticated 
Decree? 
B. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The Utah cases addressing subject matter jurisdiction are 
consistent in reviewing the lower court's conclusion of law in 
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stan - ''accord ' m a , court n^> -.-Liwu.ar delexen^e," 
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actually invoking ^ _:h "jurisdi -' herself « self-evio 
n l I iii liiiii Dersonal iurisdiction, at Le -*• on^^ subject matter 
jm LsdicL » . v^, may account for t ; . _ 
or need for same >wever , because tr.f- 'rial court rur : •-
nil I I in Il ersonai junsdiciic^ - e^r ^+: 
Dismissal, pp. . < ^ ^ s^nc^ the trial r-ourt ad.^i^e,. ., 
difficulty wit1 issue or : ircit impression Tr. Ma\ 
.* "^  " *"'• •" -rr^-oriate standard 
KJL a^pei ;c", r v^ie'w - Liit personal jurisci. t,_ . .,ue shoi . o 
i* • rj<» so:' **h- ?tandarc review c ted above for a/ ? -
r "r * : on ui error, 
according \:- triaj JU; .
 f^ 3i ; ^uiai dt:.erence." 
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C. ISSUE PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT 
The issue was preserved in trial court [Record, p. 37] through 
Appellants "Memorandum of Points and Authorities With Regard To 
Jurisdiction of a Foreign Decree," and through oral argument [Dec. 
13 x96 Tr. 3-8]. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
IS DETERMINATIVE OF THIS APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO 
THIS APPEAL 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: 
1. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: 
^
1 A
™end V: 
No person shall...be deprived of life, 
liberty, ->r proo-- without di :t.e process of 
law. 
hi Amend XIV: 
i i or shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any persoi it within 
its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
2. CONSTITUTION STATE 01 IJ I i Ill • 
a] Art. I £ Due Process of law]. 
No I in • if so, .*^  * ^  ~w ~wp*. * , -^ « ... . I ii_, . n~ "-"" 
or j-i perty, without due process of lau 
b ] 1 § II 1 [ Cour bs opei i - Redress o f 
Injur 
*.-,«*. .,- shall be open, . . . . erson 
shall be barred from prosecuting J. • c-ndmg 
before arv tribunal in this Stat* r>y r. .mself 
or courr- • ~4vil cause t< ; is a 
party .  
B. STATUTES: 
] UTAH CODE ANN. §78-22a-2 \Foreign Judgment Act] 
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(1) As used in this chapter, "foreign 
judgment11 means any judgment, decree, or order 
of a court of the United States or of any 
other court whose acts are entitled to full 
faith and credit in this state. 
(2) A copy of a foreign judgment 
authenticated in accordance with an 
appropriate act of Congress or an appropriate 
act of Utah may be filed with the clerk of any 
district court in Utah. The clerk of the 
district court shall treat the foreign 
judgment in all respects as a judgment of a 
district court of Utah. 
(3) A foreign judgment filed under this 
chapter has the same effect and is subject to 
the same procedures, defenses, enforcement, 
satisfaction, and proceedings for reopening, 
vacating, setting aside, or staying as a 
judgment of a district court of this state. 
2. UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5(7)(g)(i) [Alimony Modification!: 
The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
substantive changes and new orders regarding 
alimony based on a substantial material change 
in circumstances not foreseeable at the time 
of the divorce. 
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VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I NATURE OP THE CASE 
This " enforcement case '~ --"hich Plaintiff 
domesticates nei ~*-irc *->~^,.^ ^ p r ^ ^ ^— <-••.-<: 
JlSt: .ct r-.mi-rt- . 
• • * Utah, I- d-ntifl soirjiit additLor ai relief. ueienu ••., 
esiden4 rxed u^ L e u I, <^  *"•- ^ ^ ^ ^hv 
.^ . ^  ,. . . contempt now :: •] : p a > I: :i :ii = 
ex-wife'i- -»*t rney " o. • * ::he alimony 
; U U I L uu^ -1*• ^*- i ? ! change :! i 1 
ciicumstances (bankr u p u r ot purchase of his chiropractj c pr ac t:i ce 
build up over a 1 J fetime) . The district court judge held that 
Def € ii ication request, ho 1 rl i nq 
that the . i HULL jacked subject matter and persona J 
jurisdict 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER C U L K T 
Plaint if f . Appr • . ee Dorerid Banklei nereafte :x-Wife") 
oL T Defendant ' ?\r ~el lant 
(hr-reafte -HusbaiK. wtertw -.•. .*>. . . December/ ~ in 
Superior Court (San Bernardino County; ,
 L R*- • rd. fc , "Judgment r-
Dissolution11]. Ex-Wife later sought to collect what she claimed 
to be unpaid alimony and obtained extension of alimony from October 
1, 1995 through September 30, 1999, through an "Order After 
Hearing", issued by the above California Superior Court on or about 
April 2, 1996. [Record, p. 11, "Order After Hearing."] Ex-Husband 
was not present at the California hearing. He had moved to Utah 
and because of a bankruptcy of the party he had sold his business 
and was unable to pay alimony and had a material change in 
circumstances. Tr 6: 13-24; Record, p. 29, pg. 5 (Verified 
Petition to Modify Decree Divorce). 
Ex-Wife then domesticated the case in the Fifth Judicial 
District Court, Washington County, Utah and sought not only 
enforcement of the California judgment but also an order to show 
cause (Record p. 22-24) and request for attorneys fees in the Utah 
Court. See also Record pp 16-17, "Notice of Filing Foreign 
Judgment" and Record pp. 18-21, "Motion for Order To Show Cause" 
and "Affidavit In Support of Order to Show Cause". Ex-Husband 
sought equitable relief in the same Utah case by filing a Verified 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce Record p. 28 and served same 
on Ex-Wife. Record pp 3 3-35. Ex-Wife objected. Record, p. 49, 
"Answer." After briefing and argument, the Utah District Court 
dismissed Ex-Husband's Verified Petition for lack of subject matter 
and personal jurisdiction, acknowledging full faith and credit for 
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the California alimony judgment, for the California-based Ex-Wife, 
while refusing to accept jurisdiction in that same case as to 
claims raised by the Utah-resident Ex-Husband before that same Utah 
court on alimony issues arising out of the Decree which Ex-Wife 
domesticated in Utah. Record p. 54, "Order of Dismissal." 
Ex-Husband then filed his Notice of Appeal to this Court. 
Record p. 57. 
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VIII. SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
Appellant maintains that he, a Utah resident, should have at 
least as much of a right to defend himself as Appellee, a 
California resident, has to prosecute him in a Utah district court. 
This is especially so after Appellee chose the Utah district court 
to domesticate not only the one-year alimony award which had been, 
reduced to judgment in California, but instead domesticated the 
entire Judgment of Dissolution [See Record, p. 16], thereby 
rendering the Utah Foreign Judgment Act applicable to the entire 
decree of divorce. The U.F.J.A. renders a foreign judgment filed 
under the Act subject to the same procedures, defenses, reopening, 
setting aside, etc. as a judgment of a district court in Utah. See 
U.C.A. §78-22a-2(3). The lower court should have allowed Appellant 
to defend against a show cause order and attorneys fees award 
brought in addition to an enforcement action, and should also have 
allowed Appellant to file a Verified Petition To Modify Decree of 
Divorce, since the entire decree of divorce was now fully 
domesticated under the U.F.J.A. Instead the district court held 
that it lacked both subject matter and personal jurisdiction to 
allow such a "re-opening". 
Appellant believes the Utah Court gave the out-of-state party 
more "full faith and credit" than it offered him, denied him access 
10 
to the Courts in violation of UTAH CONST. Art. I §11; violated his 
due process by not allowing him an opportunity to be fully heard on 
why he could not pay the alimony sought by Appellee, and in giving 
a California resident access to courts and due process and denying 
him his, also violated his due process, equal protection, and 
privileges and immunities under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States. 
All Appellant seeks here is an opportunity to be heard in his 
own state court on the same matter that his Ex-Wife brought against 
him in his own state court. 
11 
X. ARGUMENT 
A. APPELLEE SUBJECTED HERSELF AND HER ENTIRE DECREE OF 
DISSOLUTION BY CHOOSING TO DOMESTICATE THAT DECREE IN UTAH 
DISTRICT COURT 
Plaintiff-Appellee Dorena Bankler, ex-wife of Defendant-
Appellant Jack Bankler (hereafter "Ex-Wife" and "Ex-Husband", 
respectively), is a California resident. Ex-Husband is a Utah 
resident. Ex-Wife sought enforcement of part of a prospective 
alimony award [record at 11:22-25] in Utah. However, rather than 
limiting her enforcement to past unpaid alimony, Ex-Wife 
domesticated her entire California Decree of Dissolution in the 
Fifth District Court in and for Washington County, State of Utah. 
Record, p. 16. Ex-Wife thus domesticated far more than a mere 
enforcement order. Then Ex-Wife sought an Order to Show Cause in 
Utah [Record, p. 18] and request for Attorneys Fees [Record, p. 
23] . 
Ex-Husband Jack Bankler had good reason why he had not paid 
alimony and could not pay alimony in the future. See Record at 28, 
et seq., Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, wherein Ex-
Husband under oath explains why he is not receiving the funds from 
sale of his chiropractic business [bankruptcy of his debtor-
assignee]. This is a material change of circumstances. Mr. 
Bankler believed he should be able to explain that to the Court and 
12 
modify the now fully domesticated decree of dissolution. 
2. UTAH FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT 
By domesticating the entire California decree of dissolution 
in the Utah district court pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment 
Act, the entire decree became subject to Mr. Bankler's re-opening 
the question of alimony, under provisions of that same Act. 
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act holds, at U.C.A. §78-22a-2(3), 
that 
A foreign judgment filed under this chapter has the 
same effect and is subject to the same procedures, 
defenses, enforcement, satisfaction, and proceedings for 
reopening, vacating, setting aside, or staying as a 
judgment of a district court of this state. [Emphasis 
added]. 
Appellant sought to reopen the decree of dissolution by way of 
his Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. Under the clear 
language of the U.F.J.A., he should have been able to. 
3. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AS APPLIED DOES NOT NEGATE 
APPELLANTf S CLAIM TO JURISDICTION IN UTAH COURT 
In the Order Of Dismissal [Record, 54] the district court 
judge stated that the lower court "has jurisdiction to give full 
faith and credit to the Judgment entered by the California Superior 
Court which has been domesticated in the above-entitled Court." 
Appellant does not dispute that foreign judgments should be given 
full faith and credit, but they should not be given more than full 
faith and credit. A Utah decree which is what the California 
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decree became upon Ex-Wife's compliance with the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act, should also be given at least as much faith and 
credit as the California decree. If not, there arises an Equal 
Protection problem, to say the least. 
This raises the question, "is jurisdiction proper then in two 
venues at once?" Appellant suggests that it is, if the parties 
invoke multiple jurisdiction under a lawful foreign judgment act. 
Appellant is not seeking to set aside the California decree under 
Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., for any reason. He is merely seeking to 
respond to the broad issues raised not by him but by Ex-Wife when 
she chose to use the Utah Court not only to enforce a limited 
judgment of past alimony award but to domesticate her entire 
decree, and then go even beyond that and seek a new contempt order 
and a new attorneys fee award in. Utah. 
The U.F.J.A. appears to be subject to interstate uniformity of 
enforcement under U.C.A. §78-22a-8: 
This chapter shall be construed to effectuate the general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which 
enact it. 
Thus the U.F.J.A. appears to be a form of statutory full faith 
and credit. Appellant accordingly relies on the U.F.J.A. to afford 
him the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship, 
including being given full faith and credit in his own forum when 
a non-resident attacks him in his own state. 
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4. PERSONAL JURISDICTION ALSO ATTACHED WHEN EX-WIFE CONSENTED 
TO USE UTAH COURTS, DOMESTICATED HER ENTIRE DECREE OF DIVORCE, 
AND WAS THEN DULY SERVED PROCESS BY EX-HUSBAND ON HIS MODIFICATION 
PETITION 
The court had subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition to 
Modify because of Ex-Wife's domestication in Utah of the entire 
decree, as analyzed elsewhere. The Court had personal jurisdiction 
over Mr. Bankler, Ex-Husband, because (1) he was a Utah resident; 
(2) the act complained of arose in Utah and applied to Ex-Wife, 
thus establishing "minimum contacts11. (See Arguello v. Industrial 
Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992), and because Ex-
Wife consented by bringing foreign decree. Furthermore, Ex-Wife 
Dorena Bankler was personally served in Utah by Gary Stubbs, a 
licensed process server. See Record, p. 35 (Return of Service), and 
p. 49 (Ex-Wife's Answer to Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce). 
B. THE LOWER COURT f S DENIAL OF JURISDICTION RE: APPELLANT f S 
PETITION TO MODIFY ALSO ABRIDGED APPELLANTf S RIGHTS TO 
OPEN COURTS UNDER UTAH CONSTITUTION 
The Utah Constitution, at Art. I, §11, states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, 
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, 
any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Appellant Jack Bankler was entitled to reopen the issue of 
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alimony in the Utah Court after his Ex-Wife chose to domesticate 
her entire decree of dissolution in the Utah district court. (See 
Utah Foreign Judgment Actf supra, at IX-A-2 above). 
As established earlier, Mrs. Bankler's domestication of her 
entire divorce decree enables Mr. Bankler to re-open that decree, 
and modify the alimony obligation in light of his changed 
circumstances. 
This fact situation differs from that found in Holm v. 
Smilowitz. 840 P. 2d 157 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) . In Holm, a Utah court 
erroneously denied her motion for relief of judgment through a Rule 
60(b) motion. In Holm the commissioner and district court erred in 
enforcing an Ohio order which had not been properly domesticated in 
Utah, contrary to the facts in the instant case. 
However, Holm is applicable to the extent that since Appellant 
did comply with the U.F.J.A., the Utah court should exercise 
jurisdiction and should allow Appellant a remedy. The Utah Court 
of Appeals in Holm made it clear that "two states may have 
simultaneous concurrent jurisdiction" (Holm at 3). 
Simply because California has concurrent jurisdiction on the 
matter Ex-Wife elected and consented to domesticate in Utah is not 
a valid reason to deny Appellant his access to the courts in his 
home state—Utah—especially on issues arising out of the same 
decree of divorce which Ex-Wife chose to domesticate in Utah, when 
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she could have left the divorce decree in California and simply 
domesticated her back-alimony judgment, obtained in California. 
C. THE LOWER COURTf S REFUSAL TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION 
OVER APPELLANT'S PETITION TO MODIFY ALSO DENIED HIM DUE 
PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF UTAH 
1. Due Process Denial 
The Constitution of the State of Utah holds, at Article I §7, 
that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.11 
The term "Due process of law" means, among other things, that 
a party "shall have his day in court." Jensen v. Union Pac. Ry, 6 
Utah 253, 21 P.994 (Utah 1889). Further, Appellant was at risk of 
losing both liberty and property through Ex-Wife's Order to Show 
Cause brought in Utah after domesticating her Decree of Dissolution 
in Utah. [Record, p. 22 "Order to Show Cause."] Alimony and 
attorneys fees sought are certainly "property;" thirty day jail 
sentence against Appellant [Nov. 15, 1996 Tr. 7:4-5] is certainly 
a "liberty" interest. 
In the instant case, Appellant was denied his day in court 
when the Court dismissed his Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce 
for lack of jurisdiction, and subjected Appellant to jail and 
monetary loss without a chance to show why changed circumstances 
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justified "reopening" of the alimony award in the decree of 
dissolution domesticated under the U.F.J.A. by Appellee. 
Likewise, Appellant's rights under the United States 
Constitution, amends V and XIV, were abridged for the same reasons 
and under the same basic analysis. Amendment V states that "no 
person shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law." Amendment XIV makes the above applicable to 
the States in Sec. 1: "nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 
By denying Appellant jurisdiction to have his day in court to 
refute Appellee's contentions that he was still able to pay the 
alimony awarded in 1990 in California, and making him subject to 
incarceration and attorneys fees, the Utah lower court denied 
Appellant's fundamental property and liberty interest. 
2. Denial of Equal Protection 
...nor shall any State....deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
CONST. UNITED STATES amend, XIV. 
In the instant case, the lower court gave full faith and 
credit to a California resident who brought her entire case to 
Utah, and denied the Utah resident defending against that case a 
chance to re-open the Domesticated Decree of Divorce. Appellee had 
her day in court, but Appellant did not have his day in court, 
18 
despite the clear language of the U.F.J.A.. 
The parties were not treated equally. The reason they were 
not treated equally arose out of their residences in different 
states. Out-of-state residency can be a "suspect classification" 
for equal protection analysis purposes. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d. 600, 89 S.Ct. 1322, the Supreme Court 
held as unlawful a residency requirement for a party to obtain 
public assistance benefits because the classification inhibited 
movement between the states. The reasoning in Shapiro is that 
there is no second class citizen status on account of state 
residency. Citizens of California and Utah should be treated 
equally where there is state action. By hearing the out-of-state 
Appellee's complaints but denying jurisdiction to the Utah 
resident's defensive pleadings, the lower court denied Mr. Bankler 
his Constitutionally-mandated equal protection of the laws. 
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X. CONCLUSION 
The lower court, in denying Appellant jurisdiction to reopen 
a domesticated decree of divorce, erred. The lower court also 
erred because the consequences of its dismissal of Appellant's 
Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce also denied Appellant 
his rights to open court, due process, and equal protection under 
the Constitutions and laws of both the State of Utah and of the 
United States. 
Appellant seeks correction of this error, and respectfully 
requests that the Appellate Court reverse the dismissal and remand 
the case back to the Fifth District Court in and for Washington 
County with instructions to allow him to proceed on his Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce. 
Respectfully submitted this <p\ ~~ day of ,^xe/pyru^t^c^ , 
H 
1997. 
HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENSEN 
R^^IAYTjZfo 'HUNTSMAN 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t and 
A p p e l l a n t 
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XI. NOTICE OF NO ADDENDUM 
This Brief contains NO ADDENDUM. 
The three court transcripts and entire court record have been 
forwarded to the above-entitled court by the court reporter and the 
trial court clerk, respectively. 
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